The Line of Demarcation between Monotheism and Polytheism

Written by Shaheed Murtadha Mutahhari

What constitutes the line of demarcation between monotheism and polytheism (including both theoretical and practical forms of them)? Which idea is monotheistic and which is polytheistic? What kind of action constitutes practical monotheism and what kind of it constitutes practical polytheism? Is it polytheistic to believe in the existence of anything other than Allah? Does the unity of His essence require us not to believe that there exists anything in any form besides Him not even as His creation? (a sort of ontological monism)

It is obvious that the created things are the work of Allah. They cannot be considered to be His rivals. Allah's creations are the manifestation of His exuberant power. A belief in the existence of a created thing as a thing created by Allah is, not contrary to monotheism. It is rather complementary to it. Hence the line of demarcation between monotheism and polytheism cannot be the existence or the non-existence of anything other than Allah.

Does a belief in the causation of the created things amount to polytheism or the plurality of creatorship? Does a belief in the unity of the Divine work necessarily imply that we should reject the system of causation and ascribe every effect direct to Allah? For example, should we believe that fire has no role in burning, water has no role in quenching thirst, rain has no role in making plants grow and medicines have no role in curing, and that it is Allah direct who burns, quenches thirst, makes the plants grow and cures the diseased. Is it true that the presence or absence of other factors makes no difference? At the most it can be said that Allah usually performs His acts in the presence of certain factors.

If a person has the habit of putting a cap on his head when he wants to write a letter, it cannot be said that the presence or absence of a cap has any effect on his letter writing. The only thing is that he does not like to write a letter without a cap. According to this view, the same is the nature of the presence and the absence of the things called causes and factors.

Should we believe otherwise, we will be ascribing partners to Allah in His work. That is the view of the Asha'irah and the Predestinarians. This view again is not correct. Just as a belief in the existence of a created thing is not tantamount to the belief in the plurality of the Divine essence, but is complementary to the belief in the oneness of Allah, similarly a belief in the causation system is not tantamount to the belief in the plurality of creatorship. As the created things are not self-existing, similarly they are not independent with regard to their effectiveness.

As all existing things depend on Allah for their existence and effectiveness, there is no question of the plurality of creatorship. The belief in the causation system is actually complementary to the belief in the creatorship of Allah. It certainly would have amounted to polytheism if we believed that the created things were independent from the viewpoint of their effectiveness, or believed that the relation between Allah and the world was that of a manufacturer and the things manufactured. A vehicle initially needs a manufacturer to manufacture it, but when it is completed, it operates according to its own mechanism. Even if the maker dies, the vehicle will continue to work. Should we think that the relation of the natural factors, such as water, rain, energy, heat, earth, plants and man to Allah is of a similar nature, as sometimes the Mu'tazilah tend to think, the idea would certainly lead to polytheism.

The created things depend on their Creator for their effectiveness as much as they depend on Him for their origin, existence and survival. The world is His creation and a blessing from Him. It depends on Him totally. Hence the effectiveness of the created things is actually the effectiveness of Allah and their creativeness is His creativeness and an extension of His work.

Even it may be said that to describe the belief that the created things have a role in the affairs of the world as a polytheistic idea, is in itself a polytheistic idea, for it implies an unconscious belief in the independence of the existing things, as is betrayed by the presumption that a belief in their effectiveness will amount to the belief in two centres. Anyhow, a belief or an unbelief in the causation of the things besides Allah is not the line of demarcation between monotheism and polytheism.

Is a belief in the supernatural power of an existing thing whether an angel or a man such as an Imam or a Prophet polytheistic, while a belief in the power and effectiveness of a Prophet or an Imam etc. within the normal limits is not so? Similarly is it also a polytheistic idea to have a belief in the power and effectiveness of a man who has died, for a dead man is apparently nothing more than inorganic matter?

Obviously from the viewpoint of natural laws inorganic matter has neither consciousness, nor power nor will. As such to believe that a dead man has perception or to greet a dead man, to show respect to him, and to call and implore him for anything, all should be polytheistic acts, for they mean ascribing supernatural power to a being other Allah.

Similarly it also should be polytheistic to believe that the earth of a particular place is effective in curing diseases or that prayer is granted at a particular place, for such a belief is tantamount to believing in the existence of a supernatural power in a lifeless thing. As all that is natural, is identifiable, experimentable and perceptible, to believe in the effectiveness of the things cannot be polytheistic as supposed by the Asha'irah, but it is certainly polytheistic to believe in the supernatural power of the created things.

Existence has two sectors: physical and metaphysical. The metaphysical sector is the exclusive domain of Allah, while the physical sector is the exclusive domain of the created things or is a domain common to Allah and the created things both. A number of functions having a metaphysical aspect, such as giving life, causing death, providing means of living etc., along with some normal and ordinary functions, fall within the exclusive domain of Allah. That is the position as far as theoretical monotheism is concerned.

As for practical monotheism, any spiritual, that is non-physical, heed paid to a being other than Allah with a view to establish a spiritual relation with him, to draw his attention or to seek response from him, constitutes polytheism, and amounts to worshipping him. As the worship of a being other than Allah is neither allowed by reason nor by Islamic law, it puts such a worshipper outside the pale of Islam.

Further, the nature of any rite, involving such a heed is not different from that of the rites performed by the idolaters in respect of their idols. The performance of such rites means to ascribe metaphysical power to the personage involved in them (for example an Imam or the Holy Prophet). The above is the view that is held by the Wahhabis and the semi-Wahhabis of our age.

In our times this view has gained considerable currency and in certain circles it is considered to be a sign of clear thinking.

But from the monotheistic point of view, it is as polytheistic as the theory of the Asha'irah. In fact it is the worst theory from the viewpoint of the unity of creatorship and the unity of Divine work.

While refuting the theory of the Asha'irah, we said earlier that they denied the causation system on the plea that a belief in the effectiveness and causation of the created things would amount to a belief in the existence of several sources and origins besides Allah. We pointed out that the things could originate sources only if they were self-existing and were independent of Allah.

Asha'irah appear to have unconsciously believed in some sort of the independence of the created things. This belief is evidently polytheistic as it amounts to the denial of the unity of the Divine essence. Anyhow, they did not realize the consequences of their theory. They wanted to affirm the unity of creatorship, but unwittingly ended in supporting the plurality of the essence.

The same criticism is applicable to our own semi-Wahhabis. They also unwittingly accord a kind of self-independence to the created things, for they think that to believe in any supernatural factors is tantamount to believing in a power rival to Allah. These people overlook the fact that the supernatural deeds of a being whose entire existence depends on Allah and who has no independent status of his own, are in fact attributable to Allah before being attributed to him.

He is nothing more than a medium through which Divine favour is conveyed. Is it polytheistic to believe that the angel Jibril is the medium of revelation and knowledge, Mikail is the medium of the means of living, Israfil is the medium of Resurrection and 'Izrail is the medium of carrying away the souls?

From monotheistic point of view, this theory leads to the worst kind of polytheism, for a belief in it amounts to a sort of the division of work between the Creator and the created. According to this theory the supernatural deeds fall within the exclusive domain of Allah and the natural deeds fall either within the exclusive domain of the created or are common to the domains of the Creator and the created. To believe in an exclusive domain of the created means a belief in the polytheistic idea of the plurality of work. Similarly to believe in a common domain is another kind of polytheism.

Contrary to the current conception, Wahhabism is not only a doctrine opposed to Imamate, but it is also opposed to monotheism and humanity. It is anti-monotheistic because it believes in the division of work. As explained above Wahhabism is a sort of disguised polytheism. It is anti-human in the sense that it does not give any credit to human talent and ability which have made man superior even to the angels.

As expressly mentioned in the Holy Qur'an, man is the vicegerent of Allah and the angels were ordered to prostrate themselves before him. Nevertheless, Wahhabism still want to degrade man to the level of a wild animal.

Further, to make such a distinction between the living and the dead as to say that the dead are not alive even in another world and that the entire personality of man consists in his body, which turns into inorganic matter after his death, is a materialistic and ungodly idea. We will deal with this question later when we discuss about the Day of Judgement.

To make a distinction between the unknown mysterious effects and the known effects of the things and to regard the first as metaphysical in opposition to the second, is another kind of polytheism.

Now we can comprehend what the Holy Prophet meant when he said that infiltration of polytheism into belief is so quiet and imperceptible as the crawl of an ant on a smooth stone in the darkness of night.

The fact is that the dividing line between monotheism and polytheism is the relationship between Allah on the one hand and man and the world on the other. This relationship is that of "from Him" and "to Him". In the theoretical monotheism the line of demarcation is "from Him". "We all are from Allah".

So long as we recognize every truth and every existing thing to be having the quality of being from Him in its essence, its attributes and its work, we identify it correctly from the monotheistic point of view. It is immaterial whether it has one single effect or several effects or no effect at all, and whether it has or has not any supernatural effects. Allah is not the Lord of the metaphysical world alone. He is the Lord of the whole world. He is as close to the physical world as to the metaphysical. He is with everything and sustains everything.

If a thing has any metaphysical aspect, that does mean that it has an aspect of Godship. As we said earlier, in accordance with Islamic conception of it, the world has the nature of being "from Him". The Holy Qur'an in a number of verses ascribes to the Prophets such miraculous acts as bringing the dead to life and restoring the sight of the born blind. Anyhow, it always adds the phrase: "With His will". This phrase indicates the nature of these acts and shows that they were from Him. Nobody should have the notion that the Prophets were self-dependent. A belief in any existence that is not "from Him" is polytheistic. Similarly a belief in the effectiveness of an existing thing, if that effectiveness is not "from Him" is again an act of polytheism. It is immaterial whether its effect is supernatural like creating the earth and the heavens or is so trivial as overturning a leaf.

In the case of practical monotheism the line of demarcation between monotheism and polytheism is 'to Him'. 'We shall return to Him', as the Holy Quran says. A heed, whether spiritual or otherwise, made to an existing thing with a view to proceed towards Allah and not as a goal in itself, is a heed to Allah. The existing things are to be regarded only as signs and milestones on the way towards Him, Who alone is the goal and destination.

The Prophets and the Imams have been described as 'the main routes and the straight path, the sign-posts for the people, the light houses in the land, the guides to the way of Allah, the preachers of His message and the proclaimers of what He likes'. (Ziyarat Jamiah)

Hence the question is not that to seek the intercession of the Imams, to invoke them or to expect them to perform supernatural deeds is polytheistic. The real question is something else. First we should be certain whether or not the Prophets and the Imams have actually gained such a proximity to Allah that they have been blessed with supernatural powers and qualities. The Holy Qur'an indicates that Allah has favoured some people with such a position.

Another question is whether the people who seek the intercession of the Imams and the saints, visit their tombs and make supplication to them, have or have not from monotheistic point of view a correct understanding of what they do. Do they have the idea of 'to Him', in their mind, when they go to the shrines? Or are they oblivious of Him and think that the Imam or the saint whose shrine they visit is himself the goal. There is no doubt that most of the people instinctively have Allah in their mind.

Some people, may be totally devoid of the monotheistic view. They should be reminded of it. Anyhow, there is no reason why visiting the shrines should be declared polytheistic.

The third point is that it is a form of polytheism to glorify and praise any being other than Allah in a manner that is worthy of the absolutely perfect and self-existing being. Allah alone is far above every defect and deficiency. It is He alone to Him all praise is due. He alone is All-powerful. To ascribe such attributes by means of words or action to anyone other than Allah is polytheistic. We have already discussed earlier what actions constitute worship and adoration.

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Source: AlHassanain Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

The House of Saud’s crisis of legitimacy

The House of Saud’s crisis of legitimacy

by Khalil Osman
The aftermath of September 11 has focused attention once more on the House of Saud and its ability to survive. There are growing indications that the genie of waning popularity, which the Saudi dynasty has long feared and tried to control by a legion of gimmicks, has again escaped. True, the Saudi clan is still established in the corridors of power, but an important pillar of its position seems to be seriously eroded.
The crisis has taken the form of a storm of criticism from a number of Saudi ulama, warning the government not to side with the US against a Muslim country. At least seven ulama have reportedly issued fatawa (juristic rulings) condemning the US and Britain for their attacks on Afghanistan. In a series of rulings in September and October, Shaykh Hammoud bin ‘Uqla al-Shu’aybi declared that "whoever supports and backs the infidels against Muslims is considered an infidel." Shu’aybi, a former head of the department of theology at Imam Muhammad bin Saud University, is one of the most prominent and learned ulama in the kingdom. He comes from Najd, the traditional power base of the royal family, and lives in Buraydah, a town north of Riyadh. Buraydah has been a centre of religious opposition to the royal family for a decade; Shu’aybi was imprisoned in the mid-1990s for publicly criticising the ruling family’s policies during and after the Gulf war. He has recently been called in for questioning by the authorities on at least two occasions, but has consistently refused to be silenced.
Similar fatawa issued by Shaykhs Sulayman ‘Alwan and Ali Khudayr, two young ulama with links to Shu’aybi, rule that those supporting the US war against Afghanistan "by hand, by tongue, or by money" are automatically excommunicated from Islam. Other fatawa refer specifically to the country’s rulers as "infidels."
These rulings demonstrate the growing rift between the House of Saud and elements of the Wahhabi establishment. They indicate that cracks are emerging in the 256-year pact between the House of Saud and the followers of Shaykh Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1793). The deal of 1744 between Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad bin Saud, then chieftain of the town of Dar’iyyah in Wadi Hanifah, produced a double-headed political entity that challenged the Ottoman state. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the ulama exercised religious authority while the Saudi rulers exerted political authority.
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab got most of his inspiration from the distinctive political views of Taqiy al-Din Ahmad bin ‘Abd al-Halim bin Taymiyyah al-Harrani (1263-1328), who denied the necessity of the khilafah, arguing that the true khilafah ceased to exist after the four rightly-guided khulafa. Instead of the political unity of the khilafah, he accepted plurality of Muslim states. Ibn Taymiyyah emphasised the importance of cooperation between the de facto rulers and the religious establishment for the implementation of the Shari’ah. He interpreted the Qur’anic phrase "those of you who are in authority" (uli al-amr minkum, 4:59) to mean the ulama and the amirs. The ulama interpret the Shari’ah and have the authority to administer it, mainly as judges, working in conjunction with the amirs.
It can be argued that Ibn Taymiyyah tried to increase the influence of the ulama. His theory was a departure from the classical Sunni view exemplified by Abu al-Hassan ‘Ali bin Muhammad bin Habib al-Mawardi (974-1058), which accepts the legitimacy of de facto rulers, provided that their authority is recognized by the khalifah. Instead, for Ibn Taymiyyah governance and religious learning are combined into a whole whereby shawkah (force, might) becomes dependent on carrying out the objectives of the Shari’ah under the supervision of the ulama. However, in practice the division of power and authority into spiritual and temporal, religious and political, succumbs to an irremediable dualism whereby Shari’ah and deen are subordinated to the exigencies of raison d’etat and politics.
It was through Wahhabism that the political theory of Ibn Taymiyyah found its practical expression. Unlike other reformist movements in the history of Islam, where the ultimate authorities were vested in the leaders of these groups, the duality and bifurcation of religious and political leadership figure prominently in Wahhabism. After the alliance between Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Saud, the conquests of the Saudi-Wahhabi forces spread the Saudis’ dominion and the Wahhabi doctrine simultaneously. As such, Wahhabism provided the Saudi state with legitimation, an acceptance of the House of Saud’s right to rule and their subjects’ obligation to obey them. The Wahhabi ulama became an ideological elite, helping to maintain and legitimize the political system and government.
But Ibn Taymiyyah’s division of authority results in political contradiction. The absolute monopoly of shawkah is bound to clash eventually with the supervisory role of the ulama. Suspended between these two poles, the political system is prone to instability. The arrangement is a double-edged sword. It fosters political dissent on religious grounds. The relative openness of the religious institutions enables them to play a leading role in voicing political grievances.
The main impression that transpires from a cursory examination of Saudi history is that it is the shawkah of the House of Saud, rather than the theological and juristic epistemology of the ulama, that has been setting most of their agenda. The crushing of the Ikhwan fighters, the Wahhabi political force that helped king Abd al-’Aziz to extend his sway throughout the Arabian peninsula in the first quarter of the twentieth century, demonstrated this primacy of the shawkah of the Saudi royal family over the religious institutions in the country’s political life. Oil wealth, which enabled the state to provide the ulama with handsome salaries, social status and positions of importance, supported the royal family’s efforts to absorb the religious institutions of Islam, such as mosques, schools, courts and awqaf (religious endowments), into the state apparatus. By and large, the role of the ulama was reduced to providing institutional support and legitimation for the regime, and engineering the people’s consent.
Yet the 1990-91 Gulf crisis and subsequent war brought this extended honeymoon to an end, as Islamic radicals and ulama began to voice their opposition to the presence of American troops on the Arabian peninsula, and also their dissatisfaction with the royal family’s corrupt and dictatorial rule. A number of prominent ulama, notably Safar al-Hawali, dean of the department of Islamic studies at Umm al-Qura University, Makkah, and Sulayman al-’Udah were quick to denounce the decision of king Fahd bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz to seek western help to confront Saddam Hussein.
The distrust between religious circles and the government over the presence of foreign forces in the kingdom continued after the war. The government’s efforts to obtain religious sanction for its policies through fatawa from the kingdom’s highest religious authorities were in vain. A number of university lecturers and ulama have since castigated the government for adopting policies that they deem to be unIslamic. Audiotapes of many critical lectures circulated around the country; memoranda of advice (naseehah), calling for an independent consultative assembly, an independent judiciary, government accountability and a crackdown on corrupt officials, were addressed to the king.
On the heels of these developments came the establishment of organized opposition groups such as the Committee to Defend Legitimate Rights and the Movement for Islamic Reform. These movements added renewed vigour to non-violent political opposition. They embarked on wide-ranging campaigns using fax, email and toll-free numbers. Unlike earlier episodes, in which dissent erupted into public confrontation, such as the takeover in 1979 of al-Haram al-Shareef in Makkah by Juhayman al-’Utaybi and his followers, this time dissent seems to have wide support. The demonstrations in Buraydah demanding the release of jailed ulama (1994) underline the popularity of the movement.
There has also reportedly been increasing support for Usama bin Ladin. A tape distributed last summer, showing fighters performing urban and guerrilla-warfare games in their camps while bin Ladin criticised the US and Israel, shook the authorities. The tape’s great popularity prompted the police to round up dozens of people suspected of distributing it, and to interrogate them about their links with bin Ladin and his network. The rate of arrests increased dramatically after September 11.

The Saudi government’s reluctance to allow the US to use the Prince Sultan Air Base in Dhahran in its bombing campaign against Afghanistan shows the increasingly difficult predicament it faces: a strong alliance with the US under the present conditions could foment even more serious trouble at home. In fact, internal pressures are more important in explaining the muted Saudi support for the US’s "war on terrorism" than Washington’s pro-Israel bias.
The escalating tension between the Wahhabi ulama and the House of Saud could be explosive. It effectively undermines the religious aspect of the Saudis’ dynastic legitimacy. The claim of legitimacy is an important part of a government’s ability to sustain the consent of the majority of the population, that is their acceptance of that government’s authority over them. No government can long operate without inspiring in its populace an emotional faith in its legitimacy in this sense. Without this it will be increasingly compelled to function by coercion and inducements. Combined with other weaknesses, such as deepening socioeconomic distress, the intensifying crisis of legitimacy could make the cumbersome apparatus of the Saudi state a political Titanic, a ship headed straight for icebergs.
Source:
by courtesy & © 2001 Crescent International & Khalil Osman