Showing posts with label saudi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label saudi. Show all posts
Friday, July 27, 2012
The two opposite poles of the global Islamic movement
Abu Dharr
Deep down inside the recesses of the , there is what one may call a dichotomy — two mutually exclusive subclasses of the worldwide Islamic movement. One of them is centered on Islamic Iran and the other around what is today called “Saudi” Arabia. This animation is so intense and profound but no one wants to express it in public. It is limited to the inner circles of the inner circles of the polite and well-educated members of the worldwide Islamic movement. In a sense, the active and informed Muslims who belong to one or the other branch of this umbrella Islamic movement are alienated from each other because their individual organizational hierarchies have to answer to either one of these two divergent and many times mutually exclusive official umpires. Currently there is a detente between the government in Arabia and the government in Persia; both, of course, affirming in strong terms their Islamic credentials. But are they both legitimate points of reference for the larger Islamic movement in the world? Our humble but strong opinion is an emphatic NO. We say this with the support of facts on the ground and the record that speaks for itself.
In the first demonstration of facts, there is the Islamic political willpower in Iran that has, in word and in deed, taken on the imperialist and Zionist superstructure of kufr and shirk, and their combined might. Because of this, the loudmouths and bullhorns of racist Zionism and socioeconomic class imperialism are frothing at the mouth. Their corporate media fumes with the same, now tiresome, innuendo against the leadership of the Islamic state in Iran because of its self-willed and unwavering opposition to both militarist and political Zionism. This fearless and daring position by the Islamic leadership in Iran should remind every active Muslim who knows his history of the Yahudi forerunners (of today’s Zionists) in Arabia 14 centuries ago — the same ones who were also seething with rancor and conconcting countermoves against the Prophet (pbuh) when Islamic self-rule was on the rise in Arabia at the time.
Contrast Islamic Iran with the official Saudi sponsorship of a grand plan to reconcile the dispossessed Palestinians with their Israeli overlords. The official Saudi creatures and their unofficial Egyptian and Jordanian tools are what they call the “moderates”. And, who said there are no “moderate Muslims”? The real power-brokers in Arabia and its extensions into Egypt and Jordan among other countries along with that strain of the Islamic movement that answers to royal Riyadh are all showing excessive and compulsive concern with a slowly-but-surely consolidating front that will eventually move all the Muslims from Central Asia to the Mediter-ranean in a wave of military determination to pluck the regime of Zionist Israel out of existence. The American hegemon who went into Iraq and Afghanistan, giving both Israel and Saudi Arabia a decade of wiggle time, is beginning to pack his bags and gradually but surely moving out of Iraq and eventually out of Afghanistan. We call forth the wits and wisdom of this long paralyzed branch of the Islamic movement that has been sheltered and weltered by the financially obese and mentally anorexic Saudis to open its eyes and see the light!
This past month the top news item from Arabia concerned the $60 billion dollar military contract that the Saudi halfwits signed with the American military-industrial-banking complex. What an insult to every living and thinking Muslim everywhere! Are the Muslims in Arabia so brainless as to be unable to begin to build a military industry of their own? Let them begin with manufacturing their own guns and bullets and then proceed from there to manufacturing their own tanks and aircraft. This is also an insult to the larger Muslim population of the world; do the Saudi statesmen and representatives not believe that the 1.8 billion Muslims in the world are capable of initiating their own military industry that will free them from being dependent on their enemies for purposes of self defense? And at the end of the day all these weapons purchases will end up injecting much needed cash into the corporate coffers of weapons manufacturers like Raytheon, Lockheed, General Dynamics, Grumman and Northrop among others as well as the predatory policies of imperialist occupation and invasion forces — the ones that occupy Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan to be precise. We can almost hear their chief executive officers say behind closed doors “Thank God for Saudi Arabia”. Of course, Saudi Arabia returns the thanks to the US by making sure that its contingent of the worldwide Islamic movement does not forget that the USA [and even Israel] are Ahl al-Kitab!
Contrast this Saudi capitalist cash-cow with an independent Islamic Iran that has crossed the rubicon on its way to becoming the first independent Islamic nuclear powerhouse in the world. The quality and quantity of enriched uranium in Iran this coming year will be enough for the Islamic Republic to kiss all Western offers of “uranium exchanges” good-bye.
Step by step, there is a serious behind-the-scenes Euro-American discussion and at times argument to factor in Iran as the up-and-coming undisputed regional power in the “Middle East” and to factor out Saudi Arabia as the undisputed last-ditch stand by the old-school of political imperialist political thought that seeks to prevent Iran from becoming the acknowledged regional superpower. We have to remind the pre-Imam Khomeini “Shi‘i” faithful that these audacious and resolute strides are not attributable to a “theological” or “historical” superiority that some diehards never tire of expressing to the outside world. No indeed; it is the result of the hard work of the sons of the revolution who never forgot the eight years of imposed war and all the characters involved in those eight years, including the war financiers — the crude oil Arabians.
Listen, O sons of the broad Islamic movement in the world! If we were to rip this whole issue to its bare bones we could agree, I hope, to see that there is a real core conflict that puts the Islamic Republic of Iran on one side and the Zionist regime of Israel on the other. The rest are, let us say, “fillers”. The number one supporter of racist Israel is the United States of America. Any run-of-the-mill Muslim knows that. And the number one supporter of Islamic Iran is Syria, in the shaping up of the not-too-distant firestorm between an Israel of Zionism and an Iran of Islam.
In the distorted view of things within the Saudi sponsored wing of the Islamic movement the Americans turn out to be Ahl al-Kitab and nasara while the Syrians turn out to be kafirs and zindiqs. Before this begins to strain the minds of the indoctrinated Saudi types, would it not be fair if we were to look at how the Ahl al-Kitab American officials came down on all the Islamic fringes that are under the Saudi umbrella. Washington even went as far as demanding the Saudi embassy in Washington, DC close down its religious department which employed scores of da‘is and is said to have had a budget of scores of millions of dollars annually. The American Ahl al-Kitab officials are going to the Arabian nation-states — tribal states to be more precise — and to other Islamic countries and rearranging their educational curricula, seeing to it that all Qur’anic ayat and Prophetic hadiths mentioning Yahud in a negative way are deleted from textbooks.
Can we compare that to a country that has accommodated Palestinian fighters and Hizbullah to the detriment of Israel? Don’t rush to conclusions; no one here is trying to paint a rosy picture of the Syrian regime, we know it has its own agenda against Islamic self-determination in Syria and it should be addressed at the appropriate level. But in the larger scheme of things, the Islamic Republic in Iran has managed to deploy specific Syrian tactics to help with a groundswell program that intends to place all their common resources and assets into the up-and-coming fight with the Zionist tormentors of the Holy Land and its original population.
If the leading light and the momentous policies come from Islamic Iran then what is the Saudi Arabian government’s problem with a free trade agreement between Tehran and Damascus? Why are the Saudi national security functionaries so upset with Tehran and Ankara raising their economic ties to higher and unprecedented levels? Why do we sense nervousness in the Saudi financed Arabian media when Islamic Iran declares that it will begin to refine its own petroleum? One would think that the Saudi lords would feel a pinch of ardor and eagerness to do the same; but no, the Saudi officials are downright resentful and begrudging.
The Saudi royalists are hoping against hope that the Euro-American economic measures against certain banks belonging to the Islamic Republic will pay off. But the brave leadership in Iran called upon the people to adopt a “resistance economy”. And when Wall Street and Western economies have been gripped by structural problems such as inflation, unemployment, currency erosions, recessions looming into depressions, the economy in Iran with all its loopholes has weathered these troubled economic times with relative success. According to some sources, when the American economy in the past two years has been in a free-fall the overall economy of the Islamic State has grown by about one-third.
Its economy is strong enough to make Russia think twice before it decides to cancel a $13 billion S-300 missile system deal. If Islamic Iran’s economy were not doing well Russia would not have had second thoughts about canceling that deal, especially when it is prodded to do so by the US on generous terms. Add to this Islamic Iran’s policies that nudged Syria — its strategic ally — to acquire the Yakhnut surface-to-sea advanced missiles. The Israeli leadership tried in vain to persuade the Russians to call the deal off. No success.
Sure, Islamic Iran buys advanced military technology just as the Saudis do; but the difference is that in Islamic Iran there is an advanced military industry that will make buying weapons from foreign sources obsolete in another decade or so; while in American Saudi Arabia the plan for buying foreign military hardware goes on and on and on and may continue for another century if the status quo continues.
Is he who moves along, head beneath, more apt to be guided [the contemporary Saudi establishment] or he who walks composed on a path [head-up] straightforward [the current Islamic government in Iran]?
Thursday, April 21, 2011
Libya and Bahrain: contrasting Western attitudes

Zafar Bangash
The West’s hypocrisy stands exposed yet again in the contrasting policies toward uprisings in Libya and Bahrain. The US and allies Britain and France pressed the UN Security Council on March 17 to impose a no-fly zone on Libya. In Bahrain, on the other hand, 2,000 troops, mainly Saudis from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), were rushed in on March 13 where they promptly perpetrated a bloodbath against unarmed peaceful civilians. The Saudi, Bahraini and Emirati troops also invaded hospitals dragging the wounded from their beds and throwing them in the streets. Doctors were also beaten up. Despite such barbarism by Western-backed Middle Eastern tyrannies, the US and its allies remain unmoved. The lives of Bahrainis are clearly unimportant compared to their vested interests. The people of Bahrain are asking for the same rights as people elsewhere in the Middle East: dignity, freedom and fair elections.
In Libya’s case, the West’s wrath has been directed at Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. True, Qaddafi is neither a democrat nor loved by his people but the manner in which he has been targeted while ignoring the brutality unleashed by Saudi and Bahraini troops on unarmed civilians in Bahrain clearly exposes Western hypocrisy. Is Hamad ibn Isa al-Khalifa of Bahrain or Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud of Saudi Arabia any less brutal or corrupt than Qaddafi?
Immediately after the Security Council vote, US President Barack Obama started issuing threats: Qaddafi must immediately comply; he must stop all attacks against civilians and he must withdraw his troops from areas recaptured from the rebels. Obama also borrowed language from his notorious predecessor George Bush: “these demands are not negotiable.” Obama, the president for change, has now surpassed even Bush in resorting to raw force despite US woes in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, which have bankrupted the US economy.
Numerous targets were hit in the first cruise missile strikes on Libyan cities on March 19. The date coincides with the Western crusade launched against Iraq in 2003 resulting in 1.5 million deaths. Neither Obama nor his British and French counterparts are likely to lose any sleep over the killing of Arabs; they have honed their murderous skills over hundreds of years. The latest assault on Libya is merely a continuation of the colonial enterprise launched behind the veneer of a Security Council resolution. The crucial question is: what right do Western rulers have to decide who should rule in Libya or anywhere else?

There is mounting evidence that the Saudi invasion of Bahrain was part of a larger plan involving both Raymond Davis, the CIA undercover agent who murdered two Pakistanis at point blank range in Lahore, Pakistan on January 27, as well as an attempt to prevent their own shaky hold on power in Riyadh. The Saudis were permitted to invade and occupy another country in exchange for securing the release of Davis. The murders became a bone of contention between an irate Pakistani public already seething under US drone attacks that have killed hundreds of innocent people, and the US whose CIA operative shot dead two Pakistanis in broad daylight in a busy street in Lahore. The Saudis arranged for blood money to be paid to relatives of the deceased in exchange for Davis’s release. The much-maligned Shari‘ah law was invoked to get Davis off the hook. So, Shari‘ah is OK if it facilitates the release of an American murderer but not OK if Muslims want to apply it in their lives?
The other point is also significant. The Saudis do not want disturbances spreading to the kingdom, at least not in any significant way. There were demonstrations in al-Qatif on March 10 and in Riyadh and Jeddah on March 11 but these were ruthlessly suppressed. The Saudis would rather fight their battle for survival in the streets of Manama than shooting Saudis in the streets of Riyadh or Jeddah. The Saudis view any challenge to the status quo in the region as a threat to their hold on power. Any change is also seen as benefitting Islamic Iran whose growing influence the Saudis fear.
The uprising in Bahrain and now gathering momentum in Yemen sends shivers down the Saudis’ collective spine. They fear their grip on power becoming loose. But it is Bahrain that worries the Saudis the most. The tiny Gulf state has a Shi‘i majority ruled by the oppressive Khalifa family that is closely linked with the Americans whose naval Fifth Fleet prowls the Persian Gulf from there. This explains why the Americans have been so lukewarm in supporting the struggle of the Bahraini people.
Zafar Bangash is Director of the Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought
Thursday, March 3, 2011
Saudis panic amid unrest in the Islamic East

Zafar Bangash, Reflections
Nowhere is there more concern — and panic — about the rapidly escalating protests in North Africa and the Islamic East than inside the marbled, air-conditioned palaces of Saudi Arabia. While the House of Saud faces no imminent threat like despots in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen or Bahrain, the fear in Riyadh is genuine. The Saudis know their rule is illegitimate. It was the British that installed them in power by carving out a kingdom from the ruins of the Ottoman Khilafah to serve British colonial interests. Now the Americans are protecting them because the Saudis continue to pump oil to satiate the Americans’ addiction to black gold. But America has lost its clout on the global stage, thanks to its wars of aggression in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US and its Arabian lickspittle can no longer dictate to the world.
The Saudis’ real concern is not only America’s loss of clout; their worry is that Uncle Sam ditched a long-time trusted ally Hosni Mubarak so casually. The Saudis may be cowards but they are not fools. They understand what is afoot. If the Americans can discard Mubarak whose regime was a major bulwark against the rising tide of Islam and loyal ally of the Zionist State of Israel, what chance do the pleasure-loving Saudis have if protests erupt in the kingdom? The Americans might abandon them just as quickly, oil or no oil. Further, the Saudis now feel alone in standing against the emerging power of Islam.
While there is little prospect of a Tunisian, Egyptian or Libyan style uprising in Saudi Arabia — most Saudis are bone lazy — it is the possibility of a palace intrigue that the Saudis worry about. True, a protest is planned for March 11 in Riyadh but it is unrealistic to assume anything significant would come out of it. Saudi society is far too tightly controlled and the religious establishment has been completely compromised to offer an alternative to the corrupt and decrepit monarchy. It is, however, developments elsewhere, especially in Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain that worry the Saudis so much. With Mubarak gone, the Saudis feel dangerously exposed. And to this end, to placate any hint of frustration in the people, the Saudi King on his return from a convalescense holiday in Morocco has offered up over $10 billion to his people in various economic concessions like the government of Algeria and Syria. The ailing and aged King Abdullah (he is 87 and suffering from multiple ailments) feels the Americans have betrayed their Arabian allies.
Uprisings in Yemen and Bahrain also have a direct bearing on Saudi Arabia. The kingdom shares borders with both. With Yemen, it is 1,100 miles long and many Yemenis — including the Bin Ladens — hail from there. Instability in Yemen can easily spill over into the kingdom. This explains the Saudis’ attack on the Houthis last year in one of the Forbidden Months, even if it was badly bungled, and exposed the Saudi military’s incompetence. Bahrain is even more problematic. The tiny Gulf State has a Shi‘i majority ruled by a Sunni minority. Bahrain is linked to the kingdom by a 15-mile causeway that is used by the Saudis not merely to drive across and enjoy Bahrain’s nightlife, but for a more serious purpose: in case of unrest the Saudis would rush in troops to Bahrain to contain it. It is better to fight their battle for survival in the streets of Manama than in Riyadh or Jeddah.
Further, any success by the Bahraini majority may encourage similar protests in the Eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia that have long been suppressed by the Nejdi tribe from Dar‘iyah. This in turn may spread to the rest of the kingdom and undermine the House of Saud.
Far from welcoming the people’s aspirations for dignified existence, the Saudi rulers stand completely exposed as the enemies of Islam and the Islamic movement. Saudi-linked and financed Islamic organizations should take note: the blood of innocent people killed in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Morocco and Yemen would be on their hands as well if they fail to sever links with the corrupt Saudi royals.
The Saudis view any challenge to the status quo as a direct threat to their survival. In fact, changes in the region are viewed as a gain for Islamic Iran, and its allies: Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas.
People in the Peninsula must grasp the opportunity offered by the uprisings elsewhere. They must also rise above sectarianism to establish a system based on the pristine principles of Islam. They can either walk in the footsteps of the noble Messenger of Allah (pbuh) or cling to the jahili practices of the likes of Abu Jahl and Abu Lahab. History will render a very harsh judgement if they fail to rise to the occasion. The choice is theirs.
Zafar Bangash is Director of the Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought
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Monday, August 17, 2009
The House of Saud’s crisis of legitimacy




The House of Saud’s crisis of legitimacy
by Khalil Osman
The aftermath of September 11 has focused attention once more on the House of Saud and its ability to survive. There are growing indications that the genie of waning popularity, which the Saudi dynasty has long feared and tried to control by a legion of gimmicks, has again escaped. True, the Saudi clan is still established in the corridors of power, but an important pillar of its position seems to be seriously eroded.
The crisis has taken the form of a storm of criticism from a number of Saudi ulama, warning the government not to side with the US against a Muslim country. At least seven ulama have reportedly issued fatawa (juristic rulings) condemning the US and Britain for their attacks on Afghanistan. In a series of rulings in September and October, Shaykh Hammoud bin ‘Uqla al-Shu’aybi declared that "whoever supports and backs the infidels against Muslims is considered an infidel." Shu’aybi, a former head of the department of theology at Imam Muhammad bin Saud University, is one of the most prominent and learned ulama in the kingdom. He comes from Najd, the traditional power base of the royal family, and lives in Buraydah, a town north of Riyadh. Buraydah has been a centre of religious opposition to the royal family for a decade; Shu’aybi was imprisoned in the mid-1990s for publicly criticising the ruling family’s policies during and after the Gulf war. He has recently been called in for questioning by the authorities on at least two occasions, but has consistently refused to be silenced.
Similar fatawa issued by Shaykhs Sulayman ‘Alwan and Ali Khudayr, two young ulama with links to Shu’aybi, rule that those supporting the US war against Afghanistan "by hand, by tongue, or by money" are automatically excommunicated from Islam. Other fatawa refer specifically to the country’s rulers as "infidels."
These rulings demonstrate the growing rift between the House of Saud and elements of the Wahhabi establishment. They indicate that cracks are emerging in the 256-year pact between the House of Saud and the followers of Shaykh Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1793). The deal of 1744 between Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad bin Saud, then chieftain of the town of Dar’iyyah in Wadi Hanifah, produced a double-headed political entity that challenged the Ottoman state. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the ulama exercised religious authority while the Saudi rulers exerted political authority.
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab got most of his inspiration from the distinctive political views of Taqiy al-Din Ahmad bin ‘Abd al-Halim bin Taymiyyah al-Harrani (1263-1328), who denied the necessity of the khilafah, arguing that the true khilafah ceased to exist after the four rightly-guided khulafa. Instead of the political unity of the khilafah, he accepted plurality of Muslim states. Ibn Taymiyyah emphasised the importance of cooperation between the de facto rulers and the religious establishment for the implementation of the Shari’ah. He interpreted the Qur’anic phrase "those of you who are in authority" (uli al-amr minkum, 4:59) to mean the ulama and the amirs. The ulama interpret the Shari’ah and have the authority to administer it, mainly as judges, working in conjunction with the amirs.
It can be argued that Ibn Taymiyyah tried to increase the influence of the ulama. His theory was a departure from the classical Sunni view exemplified by Abu al-Hassan ‘Ali bin Muhammad bin Habib al-Mawardi (974-1058), which accepts the legitimacy of de facto rulers, provided that their authority is recognized by the khalifah. Instead, for Ibn Taymiyyah governance and religious learning are combined into a whole whereby shawkah (force, might) becomes dependent on carrying out the objectives of the Shari’ah under the supervision of the ulama. However, in practice the division of power and authority into spiritual and temporal, religious and political, succumbs to an irremediable dualism whereby Shari’ah and deen are subordinated to the exigencies of raison d’etat and politics.
It was through Wahhabism that the political theory of Ibn Taymiyyah found its practical expression. Unlike other reformist movements in the history of Islam, where the ultimate authorities were vested in the leaders of these groups, the duality and bifurcation of religious and political leadership figure prominently in Wahhabism. After the alliance between Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Saud, the conquests of the Saudi-Wahhabi forces spread the Saudis’ dominion and the Wahhabi doctrine simultaneously. As such, Wahhabism provided the Saudi state with legitimation, an acceptance of the House of Saud’s right to rule and their subjects’ obligation to obey them. The Wahhabi ulama became an ideological elite, helping to maintain and legitimize the political system and government.
But Ibn Taymiyyah’s division of authority results in political contradiction. The absolute monopoly of shawkah is bound to clash eventually with the supervisory role of the ulama. Suspended between these two poles, the political system is prone to instability. The arrangement is a double-edged sword. It fosters political dissent on religious grounds. The relative openness of the religious institutions enables them to play a leading role in voicing political grievances.
The main impression that transpires from a cursory examination of Saudi history is that it is the shawkah of the House of Saud, rather than the theological and juristic epistemology of the ulama, that has been setting most of their agenda. The crushing of the Ikhwan fighters, the Wahhabi political force that helped king Abd al-’Aziz to extend his sway throughout the Arabian peninsula in the first quarter of the twentieth century, demonstrated this primacy of the shawkah of the Saudi royal family over the religious institutions in the country’s political life. Oil wealth, which enabled the state to provide the ulama with handsome salaries, social status and positions of importance, supported the royal family’s efforts to absorb the religious institutions of Islam, such as mosques, schools, courts and awqaf (religious endowments), into the state apparatus. By and large, the role of the ulama was reduced to providing institutional support and legitimation for the regime, and engineering the people’s consent.
Yet the 1990-91 Gulf crisis and subsequent war brought this extended honeymoon to an end, as Islamic radicals and ulama began to voice their opposition to the presence of American troops on the Arabian peninsula, and also their dissatisfaction with the royal family’s corrupt and dictatorial rule. A number of prominent ulama, notably Safar al-Hawali, dean of the department of Islamic studies at Umm al-Qura University, Makkah, and Sulayman al-’Udah were quick to denounce the decision of king Fahd bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz to seek western help to confront Saddam Hussein.
The distrust between religious circles and the government over the presence of foreign forces in the kingdom continued after the war. The government’s efforts to obtain religious sanction for its policies through fatawa from the kingdom’s highest religious authorities were in vain. A number of university lecturers and ulama have since castigated the government for adopting policies that they deem to be unIslamic. Audiotapes of many critical lectures circulated around the country; memoranda of advice (naseehah), calling for an independent consultative assembly, an independent judiciary, government accountability and a crackdown on corrupt officials, were addressed to the king.
On the heels of these developments came the establishment of organized opposition groups such as the Committee to Defend Legitimate Rights and the Movement for Islamic Reform. These movements added renewed vigour to non-violent political opposition. They embarked on wide-ranging campaigns using fax, email and toll-free numbers. Unlike earlier episodes, in which dissent erupted into public confrontation, such as the takeover in 1979 of al-Haram al-Shareef in Makkah by Juhayman al-’Utaybi and his followers, this time dissent seems to have wide support. The demonstrations in Buraydah demanding the release of jailed ulama (1994) underline the popularity of the movement.
There has also reportedly been increasing support for Usama bin Ladin. A tape distributed last summer, showing fighters performing urban and guerrilla-warfare games in their camps while bin Ladin criticised the US and Israel, shook the authorities. The tape’s great popularity prompted the police to round up dozens of people suspected of distributing it, and to interrogate them about their links with bin Ladin and his network. The rate of arrests increased dramatically after September 11.
by Khalil Osman
The aftermath of September 11 has focused attention once more on the House of Saud and its ability to survive. There are growing indications that the genie of waning popularity, which the Saudi dynasty has long feared and tried to control by a legion of gimmicks, has again escaped. True, the Saudi clan is still established in the corridors of power, but an important pillar of its position seems to be seriously eroded.
The crisis has taken the form of a storm of criticism from a number of Saudi ulama, warning the government not to side with the US against a Muslim country. At least seven ulama have reportedly issued fatawa (juristic rulings) condemning the US and Britain for their attacks on Afghanistan. In a series of rulings in September and October, Shaykh Hammoud bin ‘Uqla al-Shu’aybi declared that "whoever supports and backs the infidels against Muslims is considered an infidel." Shu’aybi, a former head of the department of theology at Imam Muhammad bin Saud University, is one of the most prominent and learned ulama in the kingdom. He comes from Najd, the traditional power base of the royal family, and lives in Buraydah, a town north of Riyadh. Buraydah has been a centre of religious opposition to the royal family for a decade; Shu’aybi was imprisoned in the mid-1990s for publicly criticising the ruling family’s policies during and after the Gulf war. He has recently been called in for questioning by the authorities on at least two occasions, but has consistently refused to be silenced.
Similar fatawa issued by Shaykhs Sulayman ‘Alwan and Ali Khudayr, two young ulama with links to Shu’aybi, rule that those supporting the US war against Afghanistan "by hand, by tongue, or by money" are automatically excommunicated from Islam. Other fatawa refer specifically to the country’s rulers as "infidels."
These rulings demonstrate the growing rift between the House of Saud and elements of the Wahhabi establishment. They indicate that cracks are emerging in the 256-year pact between the House of Saud and the followers of Shaykh Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1793). The deal of 1744 between Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad bin Saud, then chieftain of the town of Dar’iyyah in Wadi Hanifah, produced a double-headed political entity that challenged the Ottoman state. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the ulama exercised religious authority while the Saudi rulers exerted political authority.
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab got most of his inspiration from the distinctive political views of Taqiy al-Din Ahmad bin ‘Abd al-Halim bin Taymiyyah al-Harrani (1263-1328), who denied the necessity of the khilafah, arguing that the true khilafah ceased to exist after the four rightly-guided khulafa. Instead of the political unity of the khilafah, he accepted plurality of Muslim states. Ibn Taymiyyah emphasised the importance of cooperation between the de facto rulers and the religious establishment for the implementation of the Shari’ah. He interpreted the Qur’anic phrase "those of you who are in authority" (uli al-amr minkum, 4:59) to mean the ulama and the amirs. The ulama interpret the Shari’ah and have the authority to administer it, mainly as judges, working in conjunction with the amirs.
It can be argued that Ibn Taymiyyah tried to increase the influence of the ulama. His theory was a departure from the classical Sunni view exemplified by Abu al-Hassan ‘Ali bin Muhammad bin Habib al-Mawardi (974-1058), which accepts the legitimacy of de facto rulers, provided that their authority is recognized by the khalifah. Instead, for Ibn Taymiyyah governance and religious learning are combined into a whole whereby shawkah (force, might) becomes dependent on carrying out the objectives of the Shari’ah under the supervision of the ulama. However, in practice the division of power and authority into spiritual and temporal, religious and political, succumbs to an irremediable dualism whereby Shari’ah and deen are subordinated to the exigencies of raison d’etat and politics.
It was through Wahhabism that the political theory of Ibn Taymiyyah found its practical expression. Unlike other reformist movements in the history of Islam, where the ultimate authorities were vested in the leaders of these groups, the duality and bifurcation of religious and political leadership figure prominently in Wahhabism. After the alliance between Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Saud, the conquests of the Saudi-Wahhabi forces spread the Saudis’ dominion and the Wahhabi doctrine simultaneously. As such, Wahhabism provided the Saudi state with legitimation, an acceptance of the House of Saud’s right to rule and their subjects’ obligation to obey them. The Wahhabi ulama became an ideological elite, helping to maintain and legitimize the political system and government.
But Ibn Taymiyyah’s division of authority results in political contradiction. The absolute monopoly of shawkah is bound to clash eventually with the supervisory role of the ulama. Suspended between these two poles, the political system is prone to instability. The arrangement is a double-edged sword. It fosters political dissent on religious grounds. The relative openness of the religious institutions enables them to play a leading role in voicing political grievances.
The main impression that transpires from a cursory examination of Saudi history is that it is the shawkah of the House of Saud, rather than the theological and juristic epistemology of the ulama, that has been setting most of their agenda. The crushing of the Ikhwan fighters, the Wahhabi political force that helped king Abd al-’Aziz to extend his sway throughout the Arabian peninsula in the first quarter of the twentieth century, demonstrated this primacy of the shawkah of the Saudi royal family over the religious institutions in the country’s political life. Oil wealth, which enabled the state to provide the ulama with handsome salaries, social status and positions of importance, supported the royal family’s efforts to absorb the religious institutions of Islam, such as mosques, schools, courts and awqaf (religious endowments), into the state apparatus. By and large, the role of the ulama was reduced to providing institutional support and legitimation for the regime, and engineering the people’s consent.
Yet the 1990-91 Gulf crisis and subsequent war brought this extended honeymoon to an end, as Islamic radicals and ulama began to voice their opposition to the presence of American troops on the Arabian peninsula, and also their dissatisfaction with the royal family’s corrupt and dictatorial rule. A number of prominent ulama, notably Safar al-Hawali, dean of the department of Islamic studies at Umm al-Qura University, Makkah, and Sulayman al-’Udah were quick to denounce the decision of king Fahd bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz to seek western help to confront Saddam Hussein.
The distrust between religious circles and the government over the presence of foreign forces in the kingdom continued after the war. The government’s efforts to obtain religious sanction for its policies through fatawa from the kingdom’s highest religious authorities were in vain. A number of university lecturers and ulama have since castigated the government for adopting policies that they deem to be unIslamic. Audiotapes of many critical lectures circulated around the country; memoranda of advice (naseehah), calling for an independent consultative assembly, an independent judiciary, government accountability and a crackdown on corrupt officials, were addressed to the king.
On the heels of these developments came the establishment of organized opposition groups such as the Committee to Defend Legitimate Rights and the Movement for Islamic Reform. These movements added renewed vigour to non-violent political opposition. They embarked on wide-ranging campaigns using fax, email and toll-free numbers. Unlike earlier episodes, in which dissent erupted into public confrontation, such as the takeover in 1979 of al-Haram al-Shareef in Makkah by Juhayman al-’Utaybi and his followers, this time dissent seems to have wide support. The demonstrations in Buraydah demanding the release of jailed ulama (1994) underline the popularity of the movement.
There has also reportedly been increasing support for Usama bin Ladin. A tape distributed last summer, showing fighters performing urban and guerrilla-warfare games in their camps while bin Ladin criticised the US and Israel, shook the authorities. The tape’s great popularity prompted the police to round up dozens of people suspected of distributing it, and to interrogate them about their links with bin Ladin and his network. The rate of arrests increased dramatically after September 11.
The Saudi government’s reluctance to allow the US to use the Prince Sultan Air Base in Dhahran in its bombing campaign against Afghanistan shows the increasingly difficult predicament it faces: a strong alliance with the US under the present conditions could foment even more serious trouble at home. In fact, internal pressures are more important in explaining the muted Saudi support for the US’s "war on terrorism" than Washington’s pro-Israel bias.
The escalating tension between the Wahhabi ulama and the House of Saud could be explosive. It effectively undermines the religious aspect of the Saudis’ dynastic legitimacy. The claim of legitimacy is an important part of a government’s ability to sustain the consent of the majority of the population, that is their acceptance of that government’s authority over them. No government can long operate without inspiring in its populace an emotional faith in its legitimacy in this sense. Without this it will be increasingly compelled to function by coercion and inducements. Combined with other weaknesses, such as deepening socioeconomic distress, the intensifying crisis of legitimacy could make the cumbersome apparatus of the Saudi state a political Titanic, a ship headed straight for icebergs.
Source:
by courtesy & © 2001 Crescent International & Khalil Osman
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
Why Follow the Family of the Prophet (s)?
Why Follow the Family of the Prophet (s)?
Verily Allah only desires to keep away the uncleanness from you, O People of the House (Ahl al-Bayt) and to purify you a thorough purifying. [Verse of Purification from Qur’an 33:33]
Prophet Muhammad (s) was asked by his Companions:
“How should we invoke blessings for you?” … He said:
“Say: ‘O Allah! Send Your blessings on Muhammad and the Family of Muhammad, as You sent Your blessings on Abraham and on the Family of Abraham, for You are the Most Praiseworthy, the Most Glorious.’”[Sahih al-Bukhari, volume 4, book 55, number 589]
The Shi'ah believe that the twin legacy of Prophet Muhammad (s) is the Qur'an and the Ahl al-Bayt (specific members of his family). The Ahl al-Bayt are the source for the authentic Sunnah of the Prophet (s). Only by obtaining instruction from both these sources can a Muslim hope to attain true guidance.
Prophet Muhammad’s Legacy
“I am about to answer the call (of death). Verily, I leave behind two precious things (thaqalayn) amongst you: the Book of Allah and my Ahl al-Bayt. Verily, the two will never separate until they come back to me by the side of the Pond.”
This authentic hadith from the Prophet Muhammad (s) is narrated by over 30 of his Companions and recorded by a large number of Sunni scholars. Some of the famous sources for this hadith include:
q Al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn (Beirut), volume 3, pages 109-110, 148, and 533). He expressly states that the tradition is sahih in accordance with the criteria of al-Bukhari and Muslim; al-Dhahabi has confirmed his judgment
q Muslim, al-Sahih, (English translation), book 031, numbers 5920-3
q al-Tirmidhi, al-Sahih, volume 5, pages 621-2, numbers 3786 and 3788; volume 2, page 219
q al-Nasa'i, Khasa'is’Ali ibn Abi Talib, hadith number 79
q Ahmad b. Hanbal, al-Musnad, volume 3, pages 14, 17, 26; volume 3, page 26, 59; volume 4, page 371; volume 5, pages 181-2, 189-190
q Ibn al'Athir, Jami` al'usul, volume 1, page 277
q bn Kathir, al-Bidayah wa alnihayah, volume 5, page 209. He quotes al-Dhahabi and declares this hadith to be sahih.
q Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur’an al-‘Azim , volume 6, page 199
q Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahiha (Kuwait: al-Dar al-Salafiyya), volume 4, pages 355-8. He lists many chains of narration that he considers reliable.
There are many more sources for this hadith than it is possible to list here.
Didn't the Prophet (s) say “I leave behind the Book of God and my Sunnah” ?
This is a popular misconception. The fact is that there is no reliable basis for this statement attributed to the Prophet’s (s) Final Sermon. It is completely absent from any of the six Sihah books!!
The version in Malik’s Muwatta’, Ibn Hisham’s Sirat Rasul Allah, and from him in al-Tabari’s Ta’rikh, all suffer from incomplete chains of narration with several links in the chain missing! The other versions that have a full chain of narration (isnad) - of which there are very few - all contain narrators that are unanimously considered to be highly unreliable by leading Sunni scholars of rijal. These remarkable facts can be confirmed by those interested in research by referring to the relevant books.
Clearly, no one is suggesting that the Sunnah of the Prophet (s) should not be followed. As stated before, the Prophet (s) wished for the Muslims to refer to his Ahl al-Bayt as a reliable, pure and inerrant source for his Sunnah.
What is so special about the Family of the Prophet (s)?
When the verse
"(O Muhammad) Say, 'I do not ask for any reward for this (bringing of Allah's message) except the love for the near kinship.'" (42:23)
was revealed, the Muslims asked the Prophet: "Who are these near kin of yours whose love is obligatory upon us?" He replied, "'Ali, Fatima, and their two sons."
q al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn, volume 2, page 444
q al-Qastallani, Irshad al-Sari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, volume 7, page 331
q al-Suyuti, al-Durr al-Manthur, volume 6, pages 6-7
q al-Alusi al-Baghdadi, Ruh al-Ma’ani, volume 25, pages 31-2
The position of truthfulness and virtue of the Ahl al-Bayt was further confirmed by the Qur’an during the disputation with the Christians of Najran. When the verse was revealed
"But whoever disputes with you in this matter after what has come to you of knowledge, then say: come let us call our sons and your sons and our women and your women and our near people and your near people, then let us be earnest in prayer, and pray for the curse of Allah on the liars." (3:61),
the Prophet (s) called ‘Ali, Fatima, al-Hasan and al-Husayn and said: ‘O Allah, these are my Family (Ahli)’.
q Muslim, al-Sahih, (English translation), book 31, number 5915
q al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn, volume 3, page 150. He states that it is sahih in accordance with the criteria of al-Bukhari and Muslim
q Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani, Fath al-Bari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, volume 7, page 60
q al-Tirmidhi, al-Sahih, kitab al-manaqib, volume 5, page 596
q Ahmad b. Hanbal, al-Musnad, volume 1, page 185
q al-Suyuti, History of Khalifas Who Took The Right Way, (London, 1995), page 176
Isn't it enough to show respect towards the Ahl al-Bayt?
Is it sufficient to just show respect towards the Qur’an?
Surely the Muslims have no choice but to follow it, as a source of Divine guidance, in all their affairs. The Prophet Muhammad (s) left two things as legacy to the Muslims, and promised that they will never separate from each other until the Day of Judgement. By twinning the Ahl al-Bayt with the Qur’an, the Prophet (s) was telling us to not only show respect towards them, but also to take explanations of Islamic doctrine, practices, hadith and tafsir from them.
“Behold! My Ahl al-Bayt are like the Ark of Noah. Whoever embarked on it was saved, and whoever turned away from it perished”
q al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn, volume 3, p. 151 and volume 2, page 343. He states that it is sahih in accordance with the criteria of Muslim
q al-Suyuti, al-Durr al-Manthur, volume 1, pages 71-72
q Ibn Hajar al-Makki, al-Sawa’iq al-Muhriqa, page 140. He states that this tradition has come down through many chains of narration that strengthen each other.
Who are included in the Ahl al-Bayt ?
It has been shown that the Family of the Prophet (s) – interchangeably referred to as the Ahl al-Bayt, ‘Itrah and Aal - included his daughter Fatima al-Zahra’, her husband Imam ‘Ali, and their children Imams al-Hasan and al-Husayn (‘a). The members of this Family of five, with the Prophet Muhammad (s) at its head, were the ones alive at the time the Qur’anic verses regarding their virtue were being revealed to the Prophet (s). However, nine other Imams from the descendants of Imam al-Husayn (‘a) are also in this chosen Family, the final one being Imam al-Mahdi (‘a). The Prophet (s) said:
"I and ‘Ali and al-Hasan and al-Husayn and nine of the descendants of al-Husayn are the purified ones and the inerrant." [al-Juwayni, Fara'id al-Simtayn, (Beirut, 1978), page 160. Note that al-Juwayni’s greatness as a scholar of hadith has been attested by al-Dhahabi in Tadhkirat al-Huffaz, volume 4, page 298, and also by Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani in al-Durar al-Kaminah, volume 1, page 67]
"I am the chief of the Prophets and ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib is the chief of successors, and after me my successors shall be twelve, the first of them being ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib and the last of them being al-Mahdi." [al-Juwayni, Fara'id al-Simtayn, page 160]
"Al-Mahdi is one of us Ahl al-Bayt" and "al-Mahdi will be of my family, of the descendants of Fatima" [Ibn Majah, al-Sunan, volume 2, page 519, numbers 4085-6; Abu Dawud, al-Sunan, volume 2, page 207]
What about the Wives of the Prophet (s)?
The verse of purification "Verily Allah only desires to ... " was revealed to the Prophet (s) in the house of his wife Umm Salama (may Allah be pleased with her); the Prophet called al-Hasan, al-Husayn, Fatima and ‘Ali, and he gathered them together and covered them with the mantle. Then he said, "O Allah, these are my Ahl al-Bayt, so keep away every impurity from the Ahl al-Bayt, and purify them with a perfect purification." Umm Salama said, "Am I with them, O Apostle of Allah?" The Prophet (s) said, "You stay in your place, and you are virtuous."
q al-Tirmidhi, al-Sahih, volume 5, pages 351 and 663
q al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn, volume 2, page 416. He states that it is sahih in accordance with the criteria of al-Bukhari
q al-Suyuti, al-Durr al-Manthur, volume 5, page 197
The beginning of verse 33:33 and subsequent statements are addressed to the wives of the Prophet (s) as is evident from the feminine pronouns used. However, in the verse of purification, the gender changes to the masculine or mixed gender. This also shows that it was an independent revelation addressed to different individuals.
Verily Allah only desires to keep away the uncleanness from you, O People of the House (Ahl al-Bayt) and to purify you a thorough purifying. [Verse of Purification from Qur’an 33:33]
Prophet Muhammad (s) was asked by his Companions:
“How should we invoke blessings for you?” … He said:
“Say: ‘O Allah! Send Your blessings on Muhammad and the Family of Muhammad, as You sent Your blessings on Abraham and on the Family of Abraham, for You are the Most Praiseworthy, the Most Glorious.’”[Sahih al-Bukhari, volume 4, book 55, number 589]
The Shi'ah believe that the twin legacy of Prophet Muhammad (s) is the Qur'an and the Ahl al-Bayt (specific members of his family). The Ahl al-Bayt are the source for the authentic Sunnah of the Prophet (s). Only by obtaining instruction from both these sources can a Muslim hope to attain true guidance.
Prophet Muhammad’s Legacy
“I am about to answer the call (of death). Verily, I leave behind two precious things (thaqalayn) amongst you: the Book of Allah and my Ahl al-Bayt. Verily, the two will never separate until they come back to me by the side of the Pond.”
This authentic hadith from the Prophet Muhammad (s) is narrated by over 30 of his Companions and recorded by a large number of Sunni scholars. Some of the famous sources for this hadith include:
q Al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn (Beirut), volume 3, pages 109-110, 148, and 533). He expressly states that the tradition is sahih in accordance with the criteria of al-Bukhari and Muslim; al-Dhahabi has confirmed his judgment
q Muslim, al-Sahih, (English translation), book 031, numbers 5920-3
q al-Tirmidhi, al-Sahih, volume 5, pages 621-2, numbers 3786 and 3788; volume 2, page 219
q al-Nasa'i, Khasa'is’Ali ibn Abi Talib, hadith number 79
q Ahmad b. Hanbal, al-Musnad, volume 3, pages 14, 17, 26; volume 3, page 26, 59; volume 4, page 371; volume 5, pages 181-2, 189-190
q Ibn al'Athir, Jami` al'usul, volume 1, page 277
q bn Kathir, al-Bidayah wa alnihayah, volume 5, page 209. He quotes al-Dhahabi and declares this hadith to be sahih.
q Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur’an al-‘Azim , volume 6, page 199
q Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Silsilat al-Ahadith al-Sahiha (Kuwait: al-Dar al-Salafiyya), volume 4, pages 355-8. He lists many chains of narration that he considers reliable.
There are many more sources for this hadith than it is possible to list here.
Didn't the Prophet (s) say “I leave behind the Book of God and my Sunnah” ?
This is a popular misconception. The fact is that there is no reliable basis for this statement attributed to the Prophet’s (s) Final Sermon. It is completely absent from any of the six Sihah books!!
The version in Malik’s Muwatta’, Ibn Hisham’s Sirat Rasul Allah, and from him in al-Tabari’s Ta’rikh, all suffer from incomplete chains of narration with several links in the chain missing! The other versions that have a full chain of narration (isnad) - of which there are very few - all contain narrators that are unanimously considered to be highly unreliable by leading Sunni scholars of rijal. These remarkable facts can be confirmed by those interested in research by referring to the relevant books.
Clearly, no one is suggesting that the Sunnah of the Prophet (s) should not be followed. As stated before, the Prophet (s) wished for the Muslims to refer to his Ahl al-Bayt as a reliable, pure and inerrant source for his Sunnah.
What is so special about the Family of the Prophet (s)?
When the verse
"(O Muhammad) Say, 'I do not ask for any reward for this (bringing of Allah's message) except the love for the near kinship.'" (42:23)
was revealed, the Muslims asked the Prophet: "Who are these near kin of yours whose love is obligatory upon us?" He replied, "'Ali, Fatima, and their two sons."
q al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn, volume 2, page 444
q al-Qastallani, Irshad al-Sari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, volume 7, page 331
q al-Suyuti, al-Durr al-Manthur, volume 6, pages 6-7
q al-Alusi al-Baghdadi, Ruh al-Ma’ani, volume 25, pages 31-2
The position of truthfulness and virtue of the Ahl al-Bayt was further confirmed by the Qur’an during the disputation with the Christians of Najran. When the verse was revealed
"But whoever disputes with you in this matter after what has come to you of knowledge, then say: come let us call our sons and your sons and our women and your women and our near people and your near people, then let us be earnest in prayer, and pray for the curse of Allah on the liars." (3:61),
the Prophet (s) called ‘Ali, Fatima, al-Hasan and al-Husayn and said: ‘O Allah, these are my Family (Ahli)’.
q Muslim, al-Sahih, (English translation), book 31, number 5915
q al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn, volume 3, page 150. He states that it is sahih in accordance with the criteria of al-Bukhari and Muslim
q Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani, Fath al-Bari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, volume 7, page 60
q al-Tirmidhi, al-Sahih, kitab al-manaqib, volume 5, page 596
q Ahmad b. Hanbal, al-Musnad, volume 1, page 185
q al-Suyuti, History of Khalifas Who Took The Right Way, (London, 1995), page 176
Isn't it enough to show respect towards the Ahl al-Bayt?
Is it sufficient to just show respect towards the Qur’an?
Surely the Muslims have no choice but to follow it, as a source of Divine guidance, in all their affairs. The Prophet Muhammad (s) left two things as legacy to the Muslims, and promised that they will never separate from each other until the Day of Judgement. By twinning the Ahl al-Bayt with the Qur’an, the Prophet (s) was telling us to not only show respect towards them, but also to take explanations of Islamic doctrine, practices, hadith and tafsir from them.
“Behold! My Ahl al-Bayt are like the Ark of Noah. Whoever embarked on it was saved, and whoever turned away from it perished”
q al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn, volume 3, p. 151 and volume 2, page 343. He states that it is sahih in accordance with the criteria of Muslim
q al-Suyuti, al-Durr al-Manthur, volume 1, pages 71-72
q Ibn Hajar al-Makki, al-Sawa’iq al-Muhriqa, page 140. He states that this tradition has come down through many chains of narration that strengthen each other.
Who are included in the Ahl al-Bayt ?
It has been shown that the Family of the Prophet (s) – interchangeably referred to as the Ahl al-Bayt, ‘Itrah and Aal - included his daughter Fatima al-Zahra’, her husband Imam ‘Ali, and their children Imams al-Hasan and al-Husayn (‘a). The members of this Family of five, with the Prophet Muhammad (s) at its head, were the ones alive at the time the Qur’anic verses regarding their virtue were being revealed to the Prophet (s). However, nine other Imams from the descendants of Imam al-Husayn (‘a) are also in this chosen Family, the final one being Imam al-Mahdi (‘a). The Prophet (s) said:
"I and ‘Ali and al-Hasan and al-Husayn and nine of the descendants of al-Husayn are the purified ones and the inerrant." [al-Juwayni, Fara'id al-Simtayn, (Beirut, 1978), page 160. Note that al-Juwayni’s greatness as a scholar of hadith has been attested by al-Dhahabi in Tadhkirat al-Huffaz, volume 4, page 298, and also by Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani in al-Durar al-Kaminah, volume 1, page 67]
"I am the chief of the Prophets and ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib is the chief of successors, and after me my successors shall be twelve, the first of them being ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib and the last of them being al-Mahdi." [al-Juwayni, Fara'id al-Simtayn, page 160]
"Al-Mahdi is one of us Ahl al-Bayt" and "al-Mahdi will be of my family, of the descendants of Fatima" [Ibn Majah, al-Sunan, volume 2, page 519, numbers 4085-6; Abu Dawud, al-Sunan, volume 2, page 207]
What about the Wives of the Prophet (s)?
The verse of purification "Verily Allah only desires to ... " was revealed to the Prophet (s) in the house of his wife Umm Salama (may Allah be pleased with her); the Prophet called al-Hasan, al-Husayn, Fatima and ‘Ali, and he gathered them together and covered them with the mantle. Then he said, "O Allah, these are my Ahl al-Bayt, so keep away every impurity from the Ahl al-Bayt, and purify them with a perfect purification." Umm Salama said, "Am I with them, O Apostle of Allah?" The Prophet (s) said, "You stay in your place, and you are virtuous."
q al-Tirmidhi, al-Sahih, volume 5, pages 351 and 663
q al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn, volume 2, page 416. He states that it is sahih in accordance with the criteria of al-Bukhari
q al-Suyuti, al-Durr al-Manthur, volume 5, page 197
The beginning of verse 33:33 and subsequent statements are addressed to the wives of the Prophet (s) as is evident from the feminine pronouns used. However, in the verse of purification, the gender changes to the masculine or mixed gender. This also shows that it was an independent revelation addressed to different individuals.
Labels:
ahl al bayt,
blessings,
companions,
family of prophet,
invoking,
iran,
prophet,
saudi,
shia,
Shiite,
yehudi
Suyuti, the famous commentator, in his Durr al-Mansur
Suyuti, the famous commentator, in his Durr al-Mansur
Suyuti, the famous commentator has narrated in his Durr al-Mansur that Jabir Ibn Abdullah Ansari said, "We were in presence of the prophet, when Imam Ali arrived there. As soon as the prophet saw him he said,`UPON HIM, TO WHOSE HANDS LAYS MY LIFE, ALI AND HIS SHIITE (SECTARIANS) WILL HAVE SALVATION IN DOOMSDAY'Then the prophet; `added the narrator, `recited the above mentioned verse. After that, whenever Imam Ali came to a gathering of prophet, we used to say: `The best of God's creatures is come.
"The above tradition with a little difference is also narrated by: IBN _ ABBASS. ABU BARZEH. IBN _ MARDOOYED and also ATTIYEH _ UFI.
Suyuti, the famous commentator has narrated in his Durr al-Mansur that Jabir Ibn Abdullah Ansari said, "We were in presence of the prophet, when Imam Ali arrived there. As soon as the prophet saw him he said,`UPON HIM, TO WHOSE HANDS LAYS MY LIFE, ALI AND HIS SHIITE (SECTARIANS) WILL HAVE SALVATION IN DOOMSDAY'Then the prophet; `added the narrator, `recited the above mentioned verse. After that, whenever Imam Ali came to a gathering of prophet, we used to say: `The best of God's creatures is come.
"The above tradition with a little difference is also narrated by: IBN _ ABBASS. ABU BARZEH. IBN _ MARDOOYED and also ATTIYEH _ UFI.
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