Arabia Without Sultanism

The Arab streets everywhere are now teeming
with popular demands for real change.
By Kaveh Afrasiabi

The late Fred Halliday, a keen observer of the laboratory of Middle East politics, once at the tender age of 28 penned an impressive book titled Arabia Without Sultan,
in mid-1970s. Years later, Halliday, who was a friend of this author,(1) once told me that he no longer subscribed to a bulk of his analysis in that book -- that was written from a Marxian perspective and vested undue hope in the leftnationalist movements ‘from the blow’ to topple the western- backed sultanist regimes in the oil region of Persian Gulf.

Still, Halliday clung to his historical materialist view that the narrow elites of those oil sheikhdoms and their fragmentary legitimation due to the profound social stratifications and unjust hierarchies and exclusionary politics were bound to experience significant jolts sooner or later and that it was simply a matter of time before the winds of change traversed the semi-closed waters of Persian Gulf and reached them too in the contemporary context of “post-cold war era.” Nearly 40 yrears later, Halliday’s astute predictions appear to be somewhat exonerated by the prospects of an Arabia without Sultanism that is a shade different from the type of wholesale regime change foreseen by him, for in both the Persian Gulf region and the wider Arab world we are witnessing the dawn of a new era where the volcanic rupture of mass movements for democracy, as in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain, may culminate less in outright regime change and more in incremental, albeit significant, democratization, understood as a process of institutional change portending the wresting away of concentrated power in the monarchical hands and into the representative hands of assemblies, councils, etc., altogether featuring a rapid metamorphosis, or said otherwise re-inventing, of those regimes along inclusionary and participatory lines. Enough hand-picked and rubber-stamped “consultative” councils or assemblies, and limited and exclusionary elections that defy the elementary meaning of true elections with genuine impact on the reified and antiquated status quo aptly perpetuated by the praetorian guards and foreign powers. The Arab streets everywhere are now teeming with popular demands for real change, and in the case of Arabia’s sultans this means the end of business as usual mandating drastic measures to make the necessary adjustments that may be painful to the ruling families and their system of patronage keenly cultivated throughout their political systems, yet inevitable if they want to prevent a massive revolution from the below.

King Abdullah II Of Jordan 10 Year Anniversary Celebration
Thus, the cabinet changes and shuffling of government personalities, witnessed nowadays
in several Arab monarchies, go hand in hand with the reluctant nods from the top to the popular demands for accountability, anti-corruption and nepotism, independence and democracy (within limits). After decades of development without liberalization, the stage is now set to close the gap and sail through the turbulent channels of change that dictate the abrogation of big chunks of monarchical power and privilege in favor of “people’s power.” Spelling doom for the future of dynastic Sultanism, the current trend is toward a new political narrative that indicates the acidic mixture of democratic institutions, such as effective, representative parliaments and an independent judiciary, with the relics of the past, above all the monarchies.


Sheikh Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, King of Kuwait
The irony of conservative monarchies, forced into the uncomfortable position of initiating self-reform as a result of intensifying pressures from the below, is incomprehensible save through the intricate lenses of democratization in tune with the intricacies of local customs and traditions. In the new Arabia without Sultanism the sultans can survive only by being the grave diggers of their own sultanist power and authority, that is nowadays the focus of popular anger seeking a more diffuse and participatory political system. Whether or not the co-habitation remains temporary depends on multiple factors, chiefly the balance of forces and the ability of rulers to re-invent themselves as stakeholders in the movement for change, rather than as simply the targets of those changes.

In the case of Bahrain, where the embattled ruler has put the crown prince in charge of mapping a new course of action to appease the revolting population, now squarely in possession of the Pearl Square in Manama, this would mean power-sharing with the hitherto disenfranchised Shiite majority who yearn for citizen input and equal rights. The Sunni-led order, backed by Saudi Arabia and US power, is no longer tenable and nothing can prevent the winds of change that drift in the direction of a future coalition of Sunnis and Shiites running the government and controlling its various branches including its legislative and judicial branches. Without doubt, Bahrain’s foreign behavior and its present allegiances to US power will not remain immuned from the important domestic changes gripping the country, no matter what the degree of US’s unhappiness over these developments ringing “chaos” and “insecurity” for US’s vested interests in the region. A corresponding diminishing role and influence of US power in Bahrain is inserted in the scripts for change, albeit in a subtle way that will likely become more pronounced in the future as the internal dynamics of change shows is foreign ramifications. The US may end up keeping its naval headquarters and bases in Bahrain, but will likely come under increased pressure and scrutiny that will, in turn, put certain limits on the conduct of US military power, e.g., the US will no longer be able to take for granted that Bahrain will be a passive observer of any action against the neighboring Iran. Instead, the “new Bahrain” may consent to continuing US military presence on the condition that it will refrain from any unilateral action against Iran or any other regional player. This would clearly represent a net loss for the hitherto unfettered US military movement and power projection in the region, but one that the US may have to bite the bullet and accept, as still a better alternative than pushing the status quo ante to a reluctant population to no avail. The end-game may be not just the decline but the evaporation of US, and altogether
western, hegemony in the region, but the intermediate future bespeaks of a mixed narrative that is wrought with the tensions of an odd coupling, the strange bedfellows of monarchy and democracy.

Libya and Bahrain: contrasting Western attitudes

Zafar Bangash

The West’s hypocrisy stands exposed yet again in the contrasting policies toward uprisings in Libya and Bahrain. The US and allies Britain and France pressed the UN Security Council on March 17 to impose a no-fly zone on Libya. In Bahrain, on the other hand, 2,000 troops, mainly Saudis from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), were rushed in on March 13 where they promptly perpetrated a bloodbath against unarmed peaceful civilians. The Saudi, Bahraini and Emirati troops also invaded hospitals dragging the wounded from their beds and throwing them in the streets. Doctors were also beaten up. Despite such barbarism by Western-backed Middle Eastern tyrannies, the US and its allies remain unmoved. The lives of Bahrainis are clearly unimportant compared to their vested interests. The people of Bahrain are asking for the same rights as people elsewhere in the Middle East: dignity, freedom and fair elections.

In Libya’s case, the West’s wrath has been directed at Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. True, Qaddafi is neither a democrat nor loved by his people but the manner in which he has been targeted while ignoring the brutality unleashed by Saudi and Bahraini troops on unarmed civilians in Bahrain clearly exposes Western hypocrisy. Is Hamad ibn Isa al-Khalifa of Bahrain or Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud of Saudi Arabia any less brutal or corrupt than Qaddafi?

Immediately after the Security Council vote, US President Barack Obama started issuing threats: Qaddafi must immediately comply; he must stop all attacks against civilians and he must withdraw his troops from areas recaptured from the rebels. Obama also borrowed language from his notorious predecessor George Bush: “these demands are not negotiable.” Obama, the president for change, has now surpassed even Bush in resorting to raw force despite US woes in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, which have bankrupted the US economy.

Numerous targets were hit in the first cruise missile strikes on Libyan cities on March 19. The date coincides with the Western crusade launched against Iraq in 2003 resulting in 1.5 million deaths. Neither Obama nor his British and French counterparts are likely to lose any sleep over the killing of Arabs; they have honed their murderous skills over hundreds of years. The latest assault on Libya is merely a continuation of the colonial enterprise launched behind the veneer of a Security Council resolution. The crucial question is: what right do Western rulers have to decide who should rule in Libya or anywhere else?

There is mounting evidence that the Saudi invasion of Bahrain was part of a larger plan involving both Raymond Davis, the CIA undercover agent who murdered two Pakistanis at point blank range in Lahore, Pakistan on January 27, as well as an attempt to prevent their own shaky hold on power in Riyadh. The Saudis were permitted to invade and occupy another country in exchange for securing the release of Davis. The murders became a bone of contention between an irate Pakistani public already seething under US drone attacks that have killed hundreds of innocent people, and the US whose CIA operative shot dead two Pakistanis in broad daylight in a busy street in Lahore. The Saudis arranged for blood money to be paid to relatives of the deceased in exchange for Davis’s release. The much-maligned Shari‘ah law was invoked to get Davis off the hook. So, Shari‘ah is OK if it facilitates the release of an American murderer but not OK if Muslims want to apply it in their lives?

The other point is also significant. The Saudis do not want disturbances spreading to the kingdom, at least not in any significant way. There were demonstrations in al-Qatif on March 10 and in Riyadh and Jeddah on March 11 but these were ruthlessly suppressed. The Saudis would rather fight their battle for survival in the streets of Manama than shooting Saudis in the streets of Riyadh or Jeddah. The Saudis view any challenge to the status quo in the region as a threat to their hold on power. Any change is also seen as benefitting Islamic Iran whose growing influence the Saudis fear.

The uprising in Bahrain and now gathering momentum in Yemen sends shivers down the Saudis’ collective spine. They fear their grip on power becoming loose. But it is Bahrain that worries the Saudis the most. The tiny Gulf state has a Shi‘i majority ruled by the oppressive Khalifa family that is closely linked with the Americans whose naval Fifth Fleet prowls the Persian Gulf from there. This explains why the Americans have been so lukewarm in supporting the struggle of the Bahraini people.



Zafar Bangash is Director of the Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought

Turbulent times ahead for the Middle East

Palestinians have suffered more than 60 years of Zionist brutality; the latest anniversary of Zionist war crimes in Gaza was commemorated on December 27. This is but one of many problems afflicting the Middle East. There are others looming large in a region that has not seen peace for decades. The implantation of the Zionist entity in the heartland of Islam is the principal source of most of these conflicts and mass dislocations but there are also internal problems plaguing the region.

Two countries in particular, Egypt and Saudi Arabia that are important pillars of the US imperialist agenda are about to enter a period of turbulence whose consequences are difficult to predict. Both have aging rulers whose impending demise is likely to lead to ruthless succession battles. There are no set procedures for orderly transition. True, theoretically the Saudi constitution says the brother next in line will succeed the king (what ayah of the Qur’an or hadith permits this?) The problem is Saudi Arabia’s crown prince Sultan is totally incapacitated while King Abdullah, 87, is currently recuperating from multiple surgeries in the US. Even the third in line, Prince Nayef, is suffering from cancer as are a number of other princes. Some have back problems. Given their age and multiple diseases afflicting the army of children that Abdul Aziz ibn Saud sired — 37 from 22 wives — the kingdom is in for a rough ride. Abdul Aziz, it seems, raided caravans during the day and produced children at night. His nocturnal activities have created unforeseen problems.

Egypt is in even greater trouble. Hosni Mubarak, 82, is also suffering from cancer. He wants his son Gamal to succeed him but that is not so simple. The men around Mubarak have honed their murderous skills by terrorizing opposition groups like the Ikhwan al-Muslimoon and others that dared stand against Mubarak or his party henchmen in manipulated elections. These men, especially people like Omar Suleiman who currently heads the Intelligence Ministry, have no mercy. He has close ties to the Israeli spy agency, Mossad and is clearly their preferred man. Just prior to the Zionist attack on Gaza in December 2008, Suleiman had urged the Israelis to finish off Hamas.

Once the old Pharaoh is gone, these murderous men with oversized ambitions will not be deferential to Gamal Mubarak. They have little reason to, especially when their own ambitions are involved. Following Gamal Abdel Nasser’s death in September 1970, a period of political turmoil ensued until Anwar Sadat consolidated his grip on power. His assassination in October 1981 propelled Mubarak into the top spot but he too faced difficulties despite American and Israeli support.

His departure will create a huge political vacuum in Egypt. This is the result of prolonged dictatorial rule. Mubarak has been in power for 30 years, longer than the rule of his two predecessors combined. Sadat lasted 11 years and Nasser was at the helm for 18. Mubarak has ruled through a state of emergency that was first declared in October 1981 and has been renewed every six months. Thus, Egypt has not known any normalcy. With Mubarak’s death, more turmoil can be expected.

This would result in decline of US influence in the region. As Egypt’s ruthlessly ambitious men — generals and civilians — jostle for power, one of the most important outposts of US imperialism will be destabilised. What will emerge out of this desert storm is difficult to predict but such uncertainty can neither be good for the US nor Israel. The Islamic movement’s ability in Egypt to capitalize on this is an open question. What is certain is that two of America’s most obedient client regimes are heading for turmoil that would further weaken America’s already declining power. That cannot be bad for Muslims.gamal Abdul Naser